

VII.—NEW BOOKS.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1914-15. Pp. 441. Williams & Norgate.

THIS is a very thick and interesting volume of Proceedings. The size is due to a Symposium on the *Import of Propositions*, in which Miss Jones and Messrs. Bosanquet and Schiller took part. A very wise innovation is that each of these philosophers write *two* articles; we can thus see how they meet each other's criticisms. There is also another Symposium on *Instinct and Emotion*, in which the parts are taken by Dr. McDougall, Mr. Shand, and Prof. Stout. It consists of a rather acrimonious discussion between the first two psychologists on points raised by Mr. Shand's recent work on *The Foundations of Character*. Prof. Stout plays the congenial part of a detached critic of both. No less than four articles are directly concerned with Mr. Russell's *Lowell Lectures*. These are Prof. Bosanquet's *Science and Philosophy*; *Phenomenalism* by the present reviewer; *Complexity and Synthesis* by Mrs. Adrian Stephen (Miss Costelloe); and Mr. Russell's *Theory of Judgment* by Prof. Stout.

The paper by Mrs. Stephen (surely far the best of Bergsonianism) is very able and interesting. She says that *prima facie* there are two kinds of sense-data, complexes and syntheses; the former appear to consist of terms in relations, the latter do not. Bergson and Russell agree in recognising this distinction, but Russell tries to prove by Stumpf's argument that what appear as syntheses are really complexes. Mrs. Stephen then criticises Stumpf's argument. We have three sense-data (*e.g.* colours); *a* looks the same as *b*, *b* looks the same as *c*, but *a* looks different from *c*. Stumpf and Russell conclude that, since sameness is transitive, *a* cannot really be the same as *b* or *b* cannot really be the same as *c*. Mrs. Stephen replies that this argument only holds if we suppose that syntheses consist of *logical* terms and relations. Now this is just what Bergson denies. It seems to me that Mrs. Stephen confuses two different points. (i.) Are *a*, *b*, *c*, etc., and their sensible relations, terms and relations subject to the laws of logic? and (ii.) Has the relation of *looking alike* the same logical properties (*e.g.* transitivity) as that of *being alike*? She appears to think that if you answer (ii.) in the negative you must answer (i.) in the negative; but this does not follow at all. All that follows is that we cannot tell whether *b* does or does not differ from *a* and *c*, not that *a* and *c* and their sensible relations do not have logical properties. I would like to point out also that it is not true that to say that datum *a* differs from datum *b* though they look alike is *exactly* like saying that an elliptical sense-datum is really round because we believe that the corresponding physical object is round. The shape of a sense-datum is a *positive* characteristic of it; the 'looking alike' of *a* and *b* may be merely the *absence* of an observable difference between them. Mrs. Stephen then goes on to discuss the nature of analysis. She holds that when we analyse a synthesis we do not find parts that were there all along, but replace it by a different datum, *viz.* a complex. And the relation between the two is that the complex is a fragment of the synthesis. But this seems to me to give away her case that syn-

theses have no parts; for if a synthesis has no parts how can a complex arise by dropping *some* of the parts of the synthesis?

The Symposium about propositions is too long for me to be able to give a fair summary. It brings out very well the strong and weak points of three very different views of logic. Miss Jones's original paper is mainly a reiteration of her view that *S* is *P* asserts identity of denotation with diversity of intension. I will just make one comment. If "*Smith is human*" means '*The denotation of Smith is a part of the denotation of human, whilst their intensions differ,*' it will follow that *Smith is human* is partly about the words *Smith* and *human*. If so, when we assert it we make an assertion which is partly about words. Now this seems to me false; we make an assertion in words, but not in any sense about words when we assert that *Smith is human*.

Prof. Stout's paper contains two parts, a criticism of Russell's theory of judgment and a note on his theory of knowledge by acquaintance. Prof. Stout accepts the three conditions laid down by Russell as necessary for any theory of judgment, but denies that they are sufficient. He adds (a) that correspondence must be between actual fact and what is before the mind, not between actual fact and the judgment as a psychological complex; (b) what is before the mind must only differ from actual fact in the single respect of not being actual fact; (c) the correspondence must be asserted by the judging mind. I actually have before my mind the general characteristics of an actual fact, but these leave open certain alternative specifications. I am aware of *what* these are, but not aware *which* is fulfilled. If I now go on to drop all the alternatives but one from consideration and to act as if this alternative were fulfilled I believe that this alternative is fulfilled. If it be fulfilled in fact this belief is true; otherwise it is false. Prof. Stout's view of acquaintance is that we can never be acquainted with anything as distinct from its characteristics; that a *thing* with characteristics is just a peculiar kind of complex whose elements are the characteristics; and that the characteristics of a particular are themselves particulars, the only sense in which they are universal being that they are also elements (together with the like characteristics of other things) in another kind of complex, viz. a class. Knowledge by description is as ultimate as knowledge by acquaintance; Russell's attempts to explain the former in terms of the latter are circular because they involve the notion of a variable which itself involves descriptive knowledge.

Dr. Aveling's paper on *Some Theories of Knowledge* advocates a return to something like St. Thomas's view, as a *via media* between Pragmatism and Absolutism. The paper brings out the extraordinary strength and good sense of St. Thomas very well.

I must also mention a very acute paper by Prof. Lloyd-Morgan on *Berkeley's Doctrine of Esse*, which is unfortunately too long and too technically expressed for me to be able to give a fair summary. Mr. Cook criticises *The Aesthetic of Benedetto Croce* not more severely than it deserves. Mr. Tudor Jones writes on the *Philosophy of Values*, and Mr. Cole on *Conflicting Social Obligations*. He holds that the state is only one institution among many in a society and that the ultimate sovereignty does not reside in it but in the totality of organised institutions. Prof. Bosanquet writes a short note on Mr. Cole's paper.

The opening paper on *Science and Philosophy* is by Prof. Bosanquet. It is a criticism of the view of philosophy put forward by Mr. Russell in his *Lowell Lectures*. It is argued (a) that philosophy should not hesitate to investigate objects of desire (e.g. immortality) merely because they are desired. We can study what is desired without allowing our desires to bias our conclusions. I hardly imagine that Mr. Russell

would deny this; it seems to me that on his view philosophy would study both (i.) good and evil as general characteristics and (ii.) whether certain other characteristics are necessarily connected with goodness (e.g. pleasantness). All that it could omit as too particular is whether definite institutions in the actual world are good or bad. (b) On Russell's view philosophy would be merely 'the theory of theory'. This is a mistake; but Prof. Bosanquet corrects it later by introducing the alternative that philosophy would be the 'theory of the objects of theories'. But why not simply say that it is the theory of the most general characteristics of all possible objects? We then at least avoid the danger of confusing philosophy with theory of cognition, a danger which Prof. Bosanquet points out, but into which Mr. Russell seems the last person to be likely to fall. (c) The function of philosophy is to see the universe as a whole, and not to concentrate its attention either on particular existing parts of it or on their general relations. Philosophy is allowed no working hypotheses and has a stricter standard of verification than any special science. Curiously enough, Prof. Bosanquet also holds that philosophy is national and personal like art. I should have thought that this was hardly compatible with the high standard of verification demanded in philosophy; I should also have thought that what was strictly beautiful in a work of art was not national.

The only other paper is an interesting one by Mr. Arthur Robinson on the *Philosophy of Maine de Biran*, a French psychologist who in some ways anticipated Bergson.

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The Origins of Christianity. By THOMAS WHITAKER. New edition with prologue. Pp. xlii, 212. 1914. 3s. 6d. net.

The prologue prefixed to the third edition of his book contains an interesting account of the stages of Mr. Whitaker's later progress in scepticism about the books of the Bible. He began with accepting Van Manen's position about the Acts and the Pauline Epistles; then he was led by Mr. J. M. Robertson's writings to doubt the historicity of Jesus. His book, which was first published in 1904, consists mainly of a statement of Van Manen's conclusions about Romans and Corinthians, with a sketch of his own views of the genesis of Christianity.

In his new prologue he tells us how he has been led on the ground of the Old Testament history from general acceptance of the results of Higher Criticism which places the prophets before the Law, to the more sceptical position that the Law came before the Prophets. Mr. Whitaker says that this edition of his book is the definitive one; he has come to the end we suppose of his sceptical progress. But perhaps some further steps in the same direction are still open to him. He still believes that there was a Paul who, if he did not write any letters which we possess, yet made journeys in the service of the religion he professed; and that the journal of which there are fragments in Acts contains true information about him.

The book is issued for the Rationalist Press Association, and with others of a similar origin is of the same class with the writings of Drews, Kalthoff and others on the Continent. One who believes that the books of the New Testament are in the main historical and tell of men who really existed and things which really happened, however far away from us in thought as well as in time and space, can only notice a book like this by pointing out elements in the New Testament which strike him as real and historical, and asking how on the sceptical theory such things came to be thought or written. I shall state one or two such observations.